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Developing an Idea of Teleology through Notions of Infinity: 
A Critical Perspective on Spinoza and Fichte  





 The concept of a goal, which is integral to the definition of a 
telos, does not intuitively bear a connection with something 
quantitative, but rather some terminal state of affairs that has a 
qualitative meaning.  Furthermore, teleological concepts seem to 
require some basis in knowledge in important ways, since there is a 
non-accidental correspondence between the form of the effect with the 
form that governs the whole of the activity through which it is 
generated.1  That is to say, it is implied that there is an all-
encompassing awareness of some agent that underlies the relation 
between cause and effect.  As such, this aspect does not challenge our 
initial intuition since knowledge is not necessarily connected with 
mathematics either.  The infinite, though, naturally carries a special 
meaning with respect to man’s knowledge insofar as it is a notion that 
both eludes and transcends it.  In the realm of possibility, it can refer to 
an agent’s analytic and imaginative powers and quite simply, the will, 
underlying his moral aspirations, creativity, and potential avenues to 
self-fulfillment.  We can define the actual infinite either intensionally, as 
being a whole which expresses a reality consisting of neither negation 
nor reducibility to its parts; or extensionally, as representing a never 
ending series of existing beings, both physical and mental.   
Still, while we now have a clearer idea of how notions of the 
infinite relate to certain metaphysical or ontological presuppositions, 
we have not yet established any true connection with knowledge, which 
seems to be a challenge since as has been said, one is beyond the reach 
of the other.  The solution becomes conceivable when we consider two 
possibilities by way of Spinoza and Fichte who approach the problem 
from opposite perspectives insofar as how they situate their 
unconditional grounds, either more remotely or more enclosed at the 
level of our own moral awareness.  In Spinoza, we have an actually 
infinite intellect, belonging to God, that refracts knowledge as a prism 
would do unto light, sustains the unique essences of finite modes, and 
sets into a motion an infinite chain of physical causes and effects; and in 
                                                        
1 Fugate, Courtney. “The Teleology of Reason.”  2014.  See Academia.edu.  
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Fichte, there lies a ground which facilitates knowledge through moral 
self-determination in a way that reflects both an infinity of possible 
actions and the possibility of an infinitesimally continuous trajectory of 
progress into the infinite.  In both scenarios, we have some entity that is 
not truly knowable, but rather thinkable due to both its proportions 
and activities, which gives rise to some form of order and goal-seeking 
processes which are what make knowledge possible.       
One might argue that a more intuitive model for teleology is one 
that relates more closely to the life sciences because we can easily 
detect the connection between the form with the system’s functionality.  
For example, Harvey discovered that the vasculature and heart are 
designed for the sake of transmitting blood and maintaining life, 
through proving experimentally that the blood circulates.2  Another 
example would be the role played by the lungs in breathing.  Biology is 
also where life manifests itself concretely, of course, and therefore it is 
in this sphere where we can observe the realization of goals, or on the 
other hand, trials and errors.  Although Spinoza and Fichte do not delve 
deeply into the telic aspects of biology, the material field of action 
constitutes an end point of their deductions.  It is where the ideal and 
the real intersect.  For both thinkers, the body and spirit are closely 
intertwined and constitute one reality.  Spinoza defines God in terms of 
Nature, his substance as comprising both mental and physical aspects, 
and the nature of a thing as being the striving towards the preservation 
of mutual relations of motion and rest of its parts, indicating an 
intelligence that governs our physiology.  In the Wissenschaftslehre, 
Fichte not only puts forth an original view of how our anatomy and 
physiology jointly reflect a form of self-reference, representing a union 
of mind and body, but also merges the transcendental with the 
empirical through his definition of self-consciousness as hinging upon 
an externally induced moral self-determination in the Aufforderung.  
Despite the possibility to situate these teleological conceptualizations in 
relation to some philosophy of the life sciences, or at least a standpoint 
that integrates bodies more directly, it shall be my contention in the 
thesis that how these thinkers approach notions of the infinite is what 
determines the ordering and progression of both life and thought in 
their systems.  I think that it is an important endeavor because it is not 
up until now a claim that has truly been postulated and the secondary 
literature, in fact, often reflects a contrary opinion that stands on 
unstable ground.   
                                                        
2 Previously, it was thought, namely by Aristotle, that the heart itself was the 
first generative principle of the embryo.   
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In her Winter 2018 essay, “The Imagination in Kant and Fichte”, 
Virginia López-Domínguez attempts to make the argument that in 
Fichte, a more constitutive imaginative function is essential to a unity 
that underlies the different faculties of the human mind and a 
homeostatic balance there and cosmically.  For this reason, she claims 
that Fichte grants it the status of the “basic faculty of man”, building 
upon its role in Kant as that which mediates between sensibility and the 
spontaneous understanding, into the most profound of all processes 
that generates the categories of the understanding as well as the pure 
forms of sensibility, time and space.  Its intimate connection with the 
sensible realm, and by extension feeling, is the source of the creative 
and vital capacities of an organism, taking us back to this more ‘bio-
centric’ based form of teleology, she claims.  López-Domínguez 
contends this line of thought represents a shift away from Spinoza’s 
geometrically ordered Ethics to discredit the view that the 
mathematical references by Fichte represent anything more than a 
form of imagery.3  She is right to point out the expanded role for the 
imagination, given Fichte’s innovative choice to build his system of 
freedom around the Thathandlung, or action, for it is that faculty which 
helps one to envision one’s possible actions.  As man goes out into the 
world and encounters obstacles, it is the imagination that constructs 
possible alternatives; in times of danger, it envisions possible threats; 
and it is the imagination that presents to him the object of his desires.  
She argues, therefore, that Fichte adopts this central role for the 
imagination and in the process diverges from Kant, who adopted the 
long held view of the faculty as subject to error, delirium, and unwanted 
representations, and as a result subordinated its role to other faculties 
of the mind.    
Unfortunately, this kind of interpretation fails to recognize the 
deeper underpinnings of Fichte’s modifications of Kant’s system.  While 
it is true that the German Idealist diverges from Spinoza’s assumptions 
about mathematics – those corresponding with Euclidean geometry and 
an analytic viewpoint, and indeed does so in order to construct his own 
teleological system, it does not indicate any kind of diminution in his 
                                                        
3 In secondary literature on Spinoza, there is a similar tendency as illustrated 
in Spinoza’s Geometry of Power by Valtteri Viljanen.  Viljanen uses geometry as 
a model to represent God’s power which is purely actual since in geometry, 
necessity is the overarching principle.  He also references geometric 
deductions based on definitions to explicate Spinoza’s concept of essence, 
which is that set of properties jointly sufficient and severally necessary for 
identity, as well as that principle by which everything pertaining to God can be 
inferred from his definition.    
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thought of how centrally mathematical ideas figure, but rather an 
evolution and possibly an advancement in his philosophy of 
mathematics, in comparison with that of the 17th century rationalist 
from Amsterdam.  Indeed, Fichte does relate the synthetic aspects of 
the imagination as well as the generalizing and certain nature of its 
‘inner-eye’, the intellectual intuition, with that of geometry, to explain 
both the necessity and the freedom with which the mind acts.  What 
Lopéz-Domínguez overlooks is that the mathematizing processes of the 
mind in the Wissenschaftslehre, and possibly Fichte’s notion of 
mathematics and the infinite, serve as a kind of check on the aberrations 
of the imaginative function.  On the other hand, it is really Spinoza’s 
metaphysics that revolves around the maintenance of a kind of 
homeostasis in a way that is integrated with his mathematical 
assumptions, and it does so without any active intervention by the 
imagination to boot.  Indeed, his analytic perspective on mathematics – 
that which relies purely on non-contradictory definitions, is precisely 
what justifies his indivisible substance and devaluation of the 
imagination, which counts by dividing things.  Fichte does propose a 
rather robust form of teleology, but it is driven more by a pursuit of 
progress, and it is not so much fundamentally fueled by the imagination 
as it is by the synthetic notions of intellectual intuition and the 
universal will.  Further, as I shall demonstrate, it is through developing 
a grasp of Fichte’s philosophy of mathematics that we can carry out a 
comprehensive assessment of how unified and effective his brand of 
teleology truly is.  It is true that the imagination is a very important 
aspect in Fichte as it ultimately serves as a bridge which unites the 
mind’s operations underlying theoretical knowledge with those 
underlying practice.  But it is his philosophy of mathematics, which 
includes a constructive form of geometry, that constitutes the more 
fundamental channel by which we can gauge both the unity and 
trajectory of his system.  The same is true for Spinoza and that is part of 
the reason that we ought to compare their competing perspectives in 
this light.   
 Given the foregoing, it is worth stating from the outset that we 
seek to avoid any preconceptions about how to define a thinker, namely 
Spinoza and Fichte, or a given concept, such as ‘infinity’ or ‘teleology.’  
Spinoza is known for his affinity for geometry through the title and 
argumentative style of his work, Ethica: Ordine Geometrico demonstrata, 
but it does not bestow upon him some monopoly on this notion of 
employing mathematics in metaphysics.  On the other hand, while 
Fichte is generally thought of as occupying a philosophical standpoint 
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diametrically opposed to Spinoza, there are certain common threads, 
not only in terms of the pivotal role of their respective philosophies of 
mathematics, but also in terms of how they define man’s relationship 
with God, the elevated status of the intuition as a form of knowledge, 
certain aspects of their designated grounds of reality, and their striving 
to achieve a complete unity.  That is to say, Fichte, who of course came 
later, was inspired by the system building Spinoza, perhaps to an equal 
degree as he was by Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ to an internalist 
epistemology.  By evaluating the merits of the different arguments for 
analytic versus synthetic views of number and geometry, as well as 
considering the viability of other concepts such as Cantor’s transfinite 
numbers,4 we aim to ground our discussion of infinity from a 
theoretical standpoint.  In terms of teleology, it is generally understood 
as referring to the development of concepts referring to activities 
whose ends lie within themselves, which seems to be some condition of 
this non-accidental relation between cause and effect we took note of 
earlier.  How or whether it is possible to synthesize such notions with 
chance and to determine the necessity or form of changeability therein, 
are other problems that shall be explored.  Moreover, there is the 
possibility to define teleology either with respect to the unity of the 
mind’s processes and/or that of those corresponding with the universe 
as a whole, and so we will need to establish a working definition that 
takes into account the various perspectives advanced in the history of 
philosophy and by our own analysis.   
 Before we address the significance of their differences in their 
philosophies of infinity, we should recognize the high value they both 
ascribe to mathematics in general, and the link they establish with some 
form of intuition, which figures at the top of their epistemologies.  The 
basic metaphysical point of reference used by Spinoza and Fichte, 
respectively, is that of God defined in terms of substance or his infinite 
intellect, and the self that constructs a world.  The forms of knowledge 
that they prize are in turn applied to these respective domains – 
namely, substance and its modes in Spinoza, and the self’s operations in 
Fichte.  In their magna opera, Ethics and the Wissenschaftslehre, that 
aim to lay the foundation for knowledge as such, and elsewhere in their 
oeuvre, for instance Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the 
                                                        
4 In the case of Cantor’s transfinite numbers, they were at least not originally 
integrated into interpretations of Spinoza’s or Fichte’s systems.  By 
incorporating perspectives that are theoretically relevant to these thinkers’ 
premises but which do not necessarily inhere directly in their works, we 
stretch the limits of that set of possible discoveries from our analysis. 
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Intellect, which seeks to guide man on his path to perfection, both 
philosophers make the case for regarding mathematics very highly such 
that its methods can be taken to be a model for their own metaphysical 
strategies, themselves necessary for acquiring what is arguably the 
most profound form of knowledge.     
Aside from its intuitive meaning, both philosophers rate 
mathematics highly or highest because of its certainty, exactitude, and 
reliance on deduction.  Spinoza makes the additional point that by 
knowing a mathematical truth, one comes to “know what it is to know 
something,” and that this is not true for other sciences.  Although, 
because of his metaphysical constitution of God (consisting of infinite 
attributes beyond thought and extension), he does not extend this 
insight into a complete self-reflectivity for man, Spinoza hints here at 
how his mathematically inspired, deductive metaphysical system can 
illuminate how one’s knowledge or true ideas are a derivative of the 
divine infinite intellect.  At a more ontological level, the homeostasis 
alluded to earlier can essentially be understood with respect to a 
balancing of activity with passivity, or in more physical terms, motion 
and rest.  Naturally, one can employ mathematics to measure to what 
extent these relations vary or approach an equilibrium.  Spinoza’s 
selection of the intuition used to derive the unknown term in a ratio 
equated to another ratio, as the highest form of knowledge, takes on 
significance for these relations of motion and rest, which bears a close 
relation to a thing’s conatus, the force by which it perseveres in existing.  
Further, the intuition, specifically what he calls the scientia intuitiva, 
reflects an advantage over formulating a procedure or axiom based on 
experience, in that one grasps the truth immediately, “in a single 
glance,” without recourse to a more mechanical sort of method which 
stands independent of true comprehension.  The point Spinoza is 
making is that an intuition based mathematical analysis enables one to 
precisely and self-evidently define the activity of one part or one mode 
based on that of the surrounding entities.  What I believe will be found 
to be even more important is how we can come to understand the 
nature of the ultimate ground, in terms of what kind of infinity by which 
it can be measured, that sustains these modes and essences.  For it is 
that quality that will prove critical in how the ground modifies the 
activities of these entities.  
 The nature and implications of the departure by Fichte from the 
relativity and metrically driven mechanism5 of Spinoza will be made 
                                                        
5 That is, the notion of defining essence mechanistically and in numerical 
terms (mutual relations of motion and rest).  
 7 
clear during the course of this thesis.  Fichte first establishes a 
foundation through some modified form of mathematics to introduce 
an alternative perspective and ultimately a comprehensive framework 
to help ensure that both freedom and unity govern his metaphysical 
system.  It seems counter-intuitive to ground mathematics, a science so 
focused on calculations and relative comparisons, in qualitative, non-
metrical standards, and absolute principles of judgment.  Yet that is 
precisely what Fichte does to avoid the trap of a mathematics limited by 
empty formalisms and circularities, like that found in Euclid’s Fifth 
Postulate, and it is indeed by employing the intuition as his weapon of 
choice that he achieves this aim.  Fichte develops the thought that 
without a normal line with normalizing direction to serve as a standard 
for a determination of  the parallelism of other lines, there emerges a 
circular logic between the measure of the two interior angles and the 
intersection of the corresponding lines, which is what we encounter in 
the Fifth Postulate.  The idea is that without an absolute standard, lines 
can be demonstrated to be parallel to each other only on a more 
relative basis, which becomes inevitable especially in non-Euclidean 
spaces.  The straightness and directionality, which are essential to these 
normalizing lines, are discoverable synthetically by intuition insofar as 
they are qualities grasped to be necessary to connect two points with 
each other.  Euclid and his follower in Spinoza, by contrast, do not think 
about geometry in terms of directionality; rather the line is an 
aggregation of points, which is an analytic definition.  The objective at 
this level of the discussion in the thesis is to establish how these 
features of Spinoza’s and Fichte’s presentation are not merely for 
illustration purposes, but rather serve as groundwork both for their 
explanations as to the source of knowledge and the nature of teleology.  
We go through this exercise to show why they elevate mathematics as a 
form of knowledge, to present the assumptions behind their respective 
stances on whether mathematical truths are analytic or synthetic, in 
order to set up the core discussion on notions of teleology and the 
infinite.  As I indicated above, there is some ambiguity about how to 
define teleology adequately to begin with, and this problem is 
complicated further when we take into consideration the influence of or 
interaction with notions of mathematics and specifically, infinity.   
It seems that knowledge, and specifically intuition, is integral to 
how we ought to think about teleology, and its connection with notions 
of infinity is certainly a subtle one.  In our analysis of Spinoza, the first 
goals here will be to define intuition and then explicate how an intuition 
of individual essences of finite modes follows from an intuition of God’s 
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infinite essence.  The next step, which naturally follows, is to 
understand the connection between his concept of intuition and 
mathematics.  Although the problem of how to derive the finite from the 
infinite (necessary to derive the unique essences of things) is not a new 
one, this scientia intuitiva is generally viewed as a form of knowledge 
that is not necessarily connected with mathematics per se, despite 
Spinoza’s choice to use an example of an algebraic equation involving 
proportions.  It will be my contention that the example from 
mathematics is not truly contingent given different indications some of 
which has been discussed above.  As has been said, what is more 
fundamental is his notion of an actual infinity, which may have 
problematic consequences for how to interpret the possibility of some 
equilibrium of mutual relations of motion and rest, a state of affairs that 
reflects some form of teleology and one which is graspable by means of 
intuition.  To what extent other analytical forms of infinity, such as 
Cantor’s transfinite numbers, can establish a more seamless transition 
between different kinds of modes, and potentially a more stable system, 
will need to be proven.        
In Fichte’s concept of mathematics, we see traces of his 
metaphysical strategy to relax the suffocating grip of necessitarianism 
that we see plainly evident in Spinoza.  Whereas the Dutch rationalist, 
following the doctrines of Leibniz and Wolff, views essences of things as 
absolutely necessary, akin to the properties of a triangle, Fichte draws 
inspiration from Kant to deconstruct geometry, concerning himself with 
the conditions of possibility for the triangle – the point, line, and space.  
As a result, he determines that geometric truths are synthetic, since the 
predicates are not contained in the original definition.  This carries a 
meaning for our deliberations over infinity and ultimately, the form of 
teleology employed in his system.  We can see these connections 
demonstrated first by Kant through his doctrine of mathematical 
purposiveness since it is there that he establishes a common ground 
that provides for the serviceability for the solution of many geometric 
problems in infinite ways.  That is, he finds that we need to consider 
that deeper level of conditions of possibility of geometry, because there 
are theorems, for instance those that relate to properties of rectangles, 
that can be unexpectedly derived from other geometric figures such as 
circles.  Furthermore, there are infinite possibilities of solutions to 
these problems.  Although Fichte does not specifically elaborate on 
Kant’s doctrine of mathematical purposiveness, as we have seen, he 
endorses Kant’s stance on geometric propositions as being synthetic, 
and also seeks out the infinite in this domain.  As we have said, a 
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synthetic proposition is one that reflects ampliative reasoning in some 
form as we are moving beyond the confines of the original definition.  
For a notion of the infinite to be synthetic may seem paradoxical, since 
it already has a never ending quality to it.  Nevertheless there are 
naturally possibilities, namely those that reflect either some limit or 
some other complementary quality, such as that of unity.  Taking the 
circle as some mathematical representation of God or the absolute, 
Fichte notes the impossibility and internal contradictoriness of the 
quadrature of same, and so deduces from this that we can only think in 
terms of a potential infinity.  A potential infinity represents a possible 
advantage for Fichte because it can translate into an unboundedness at 
the level of the mind that is reduced down to a finite in empirical 
reality, which is by definition more easily graspable.  On the other hand, 
in another way, it also points to a striving that is not fully actualized.   
As we have seen, Fichte develops a foundation for synthetic 
geometry, which is the basis for his potential infinity, that averts certain 
problems of Euclidean geometry, such as the circularity in the Fifth 
Postulate.  But one can detect a circular logic in one of his metaphysical 
preconceptions dealing with the Aufforderung, insofar as a recognition 
of an external moral cue and corresponding other is within one’s self-
awareness, and yet are also conditional of it.  This dilemma seems to 
underlie other weaknesses in Fichte’s system which flow from this 
intersubjective puzzle.  For example, it is unclear how to reconcile the 
apparent freedom of the will with how the system as a whole 
progresses morally – that is to say, it is left unexplained who receives 
priority.  Although Fichte resorts to some form of predetermination, in 
which the first summons was between God and Adam, to in some sense 
solve the problem, it is not clearly consistent with his other premises, 
and therefore not fully satisfactory in my view.  It is in this context that 
we can determine which synthetic notions6 of the infinite can be 
adapted to Fichte’s system to adequately unify it.  After all, there is an 
aim of resolving circularities at a more purely mathematical level, so we 
should apply the same strategy to the metaphysical one, while 
preserving that mathematical link.   
                                                        
6 For example, problems in Graph Theory, like the Königsberg Bridge Problem, 
are goal driven and are classified as synthetic.  Other mathematical 
expressions, such as the autonomously differentiating inverse ratio 
formulated by Hegel to describe the dynamic of the centrifugal and centripetal 
forces, could be useful in describing the reciprocating and self-limiting 
Summons.   
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In the final section of the thesis, I shall articulate how notions of 
the infinite, drawing on various sources, can shape modern concepts of 
teleology, in light of what we will have learned and concluded from our 
analyses of Spinoza and Fichte, taking into consideration their flawed 
preconceptions and strengths.  This is a methodology which draws 
inspiration from Aristotle who, in his treatise, On the Soul, uses a 
dialectical method to compare various theories of the soul taking into 
consideration the virtues and pitfalls of each to develop his own 
solutions.  Besides the prospect of making discoveries in this 
metaphysical enclave, it is my hope that through pursuing this strategy, 
I will encourage others to approach the history of philosophy in a way 
that fosters independent thinking and theoretical advancements, rather 
than limiting that enterprise to a faithfulness to its key figures, 
notwithstanding the importance of that goal.  
 
